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yearstotal pct change in d prof -DmnlRAMPstarting in year x".user adjustments - ecoservicesBASE ECOSERVICES CHARGE RATEchanges to charge ratetotal change in charge rateover e years nstarting in year mover g years pending in year o*FRACTION OF ECOSERVICES CHARGED TO USERS>fraction of ecosystem services value charged to recipients.user adjustments - ethicadded fractional changefractional changeimplemented over X yearsstart yeardissipate over x yearsfrom year Y".user adjustments - penaltiesBASE ALLOWED PENALTY RATE"fractional penalty rate limitpenalty rate adjustmentchanges to pen rateadjustment look up"switch penalty adjustment on off2penalty adjustment due to damaging use amount&proportion of use that is damagingIF THEN ELSEover e yearstotal change in pen ratestarting in year dover g yearsending in year f.time constants"TIME NEEDED FOR ECOSYSTEM CHANGE*TIME NEEDED FOR SERVICES TO BE REALIZED2TIME NEEDED FOR AVAILABILITY TO EFFECT PAYMENTS:TIME FOR ENVIRONMENTAL NEED CHANGES TO HAVE AN EFFECT*TIME NEEDED FOR DECREASES TO BE ACCEPTED.TIME NEEDED FOR EXPECTATION TO BE REALIZEDTIME RE PROF DIFFERENCE:TIME NEEDED TO CHANGE ETHIC DUE TO EXCESSIVE PAYMENTS.TIME NEEDED TO CHANGE ETHIC DUE TO PAYMENT&TIME TO SMOOTH PROPORTION COMPARISONTIME TO SMOOTH LNG TRM ETHICTIME TO CHANGE EXPECTATION.TIME TO CHANGE ETHIC DUE TO PARTICIPATION(TIME TO SMOOTH DAMG SWITCHING"TIME TO SMOOTH FRDLY SWITCHING.TIME NEEDED TO SWITCH TO FRIENDLY ACTIVITIES.TIME NEEDED TO SWITCH TO DAMAGING ACTIVITIESTIME NEEDED FOR REALIZATION.user adjustments - primaryLK expect phasein&ANNUAL VALUE PER ECOSYSTEM BENEFIT-benefits2BASIC PROFITABILITY OF SUSTAINABLE ACTIVITIES"FRACTION CHANGE IN PROFIT NEEDED>FRACTION OF LOST ECOSERVICES TO BE RECOVERED VIA PENALTIES*TIME WHEN EXPECTATIONS BECOME IMPORTANTNOISE ON OFF2turn off effect of lessening environmental need.payoff investigations"POff Ecosys status per payoutEcosystem StatusTotal Agreed Payouts-eco integrity.reality checks2RC no damaging use means low penalties collected&TI damaging activities is very smallpenalty payments collectedRC STEP CHECK"actual penalty payments per unit.Level of Environmentally Damaging Activities RC STEPRC Start Time:SUPPLEMENTARY .noiseWhite Noise is normMean&Standard Deviation for pink noiseCorrelation TimeRANDOM NORMALNoise Seed-Dimensionless&Noise type switch 0 is rnd normalChange in Pink NoiseWhite Noise is uniPink NoiseRANDOM UNIFORM.noise effect on damaging use profitability.eco status and servicesunit typeeco friendly damagingenhancing existing ecosystemmaxpending ecosystem change*extent of direct enhancement activities&current potential ecosystem status"max possible ecosystem statustotal units&MAX STATUS PER UNIT BY TYPE OF USEinitial ecosystem statuschanging the ecosystemmax possible services&RELATION OF ECOSYSTEM TO SERVICES.Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities"changing environmental servicesEnvironmental Services:LK ffect of environmentalism on enhancement activities6ratio of realized to long term environmental ethic&value of lost environmental services*value of environmental services provided&dissipating environmental servicesDISSIPATION FRACTION-1 .bankingFunds Available for Payouts&payments collected from recipientsexcess funds collectedall payments collected.negotiating payments"accepting decreases in payoutMINcurrent expected payouts&change due to expectation of payoutinitial agreed payoutsinitial payout expectedExpected Payout per Unit6change due to availability of funds from paymentsLK effect of low collections"overall payment per profit ratio6changing payout due to dropping environmental need2effect of environmental need on payment amount".ethic and payout expectation"turn off expectations of payment time difexpectation phase in*changing due to profitability differenceprofitability differencechanging expectationadditional payment desired2adjusted profitability of damaging activities6ethic effected profitability of friendly activities.effect of payments on environmental ethic"LK effect of payments on ethic.difference between payouts and expectationbenefit payouts per unit2environmental ethic as influenced by payments*Current Underlying Environmental Ethic-environmentalism"destroying environmental ethiceffect of penalty paymentspotential change to ethic&adjust for absolute level of payment"changing ethic due to payments:effect of environmental ethic on expectation of payment"LK effect of ethic on payment"long term environmental ethic SMOOTHIINITIAL ETHIC"long term level of friendly act SMOOTH.changing ethic due to changing participation"relative change in friendly actLK effect of penalties6weighted realized fractional penalty payment ratepayments collected per unitgeneral profits&profitability of damaging activitiesLK effect of payment level .main(payments collected per friendly unitMAX PAYOUT FRACTION"switching to friendly activitiesBLK effect of financial benefits on switching to friendly uses:financial benefits of switching to friendly activities&need for environmental improvement2minimum monetary requirement from the resourceNUMBER OF USERS&REQUIRED RESOURCE INCOME PER USER2adjusted profitability of friendly activities:financial threshhold for change to friendly activities6effect of environmentalism on apparent profitabilityLK eff envlsm on switchinginitial units damagingINITIAL UNITS FRIENDLY:financial benefits of switching to damaging activities:financial threshhold for change to damaging activities.LK effect of environmental need on payment.desired penalty payments for lost services&maximum reasonable penalty chargecurrent income level"income from damaging activities"income from friendly activitiesBLK effect of financial benefits on switching to damaging uses"increasing damaging activities -user&owners relative monetary securityRELATIVE REPLACEMENT COSTS".realized environmental ethicchanging realized ethic&LK effect of owners monetary needRealized Environmental Ethic .Control SMOOTHIINSTINI 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TŒ’ĄĄĄ’Ą’ go to:6 vB’’’€ More Controls63 ¤tA’ ’’€ Pink Noise*( œ ?H’€€€€€€ " a@Ž2’’’’ :8 D^*   ’ to banking view" Jc@iä’’’’ *( ÜšåP, ’€€€€€€ e @iø0( L Z¾a’€€€€€€ g @Ģ”Š… 5¬k ’’’€ Press H to see all components and links on this page or to hide all but key model components*( ģ@’€€€€€€  0{ž ’n$Ģ’" nkD?’’’’’  0’" (<!(’ n@I³*( ÜĻ+,’qo@v8*( \ Ob`!’€€€€€€ s @ŗo Ü OiL’u(@Ś¬un@¹§*( Ą E*( ,Źć’" ’€€€€€€ ‚€ —P ’’Ą€need to add ? lower effect of prof difference if payments drop to zero for a long time. ģ v*ƒx{@ę’’y{@ƒó’{u@ä&*( ¬Ā^+’  ü ur0{€@N>€@ W€u@Ż_zx ˜`},’Warning: the model is not yet formulated in such a way as to handle delaed awarness of payments@«žj@gB@#$@8Ņģķ -8?HNU\gpy€†–¦±ŗĮĒŠ×Žéņū ")0;AGRXcn|’¢°æŠåšų%3>IPYbktƒ‰²½ĆÉH”7LæüüōĻVR ~śek’ĄĄĄ’ Environmental Ethic & Payment Expectation63 Ę“   ’ Main Model*( l@ŁR9’’  0 ’" +€’’’’’ d’7 0’Y! < ÆY;!(’*( ĢtČB" --’’’’ "  -S’’’’  0Šß ’Ėą"  DHą’’’’  0 ą" |  V%(ƒ’" -Ö³’’’’ *( œÕ²=" -<¬’’’’  0vÅ ’v" d-vw’’’’  0vH! ·H9'(’*( ¼Ż:" -ų6’’’’ " -@Hv’’’’ *( ģĶœf’€€€€€€ @<m 0ł ’!\" !DŃ’’’’  0¬! ¬ o¬P,(’*( ¼ šiL)’€€€€€€ #"@’ā!@ó^*( ¬fÄ[&!@ŌĖ*( l }ŗU’€€€€€€ *( ę](’ 63 Æ'H ’’’€Title PageVR ))w ’’’€Environmental Ethic & Payment Expectation>: 0(> ’’’€Output & Controls61 ·(D ’ ’’€Comments:8 T'Z ’’’€Main Model ViewB= å(B’’’€Negotiating PaymentsRN (a ’’’€Banking: Payments, Penalties, Payouts*( Œ č6  ’ 1@9:6 /Q<’’’€ More Controls*( œ Ļ I’€€€€€€ 4@²2/ Čä(’ĄĄĄ’’€’ go to 63 µQA’ ’’€ Pink Noise*( L P$/ ’    *( –Ē^)’€€€€€€  , ŗD" (:+”Z’’’’ " 9:-ųš’’’’ " :+L’’’’ " :-@ŃĆ’’’’ :5 _L8   ’ Banking View?@³3?@łBŠ… šY1 ’’’€ Press H to see all components and links on this page or to hide all but key model components*( \ ‡V2 ’€€€€€€ 8@MC8@pA98@q¬ū +6=CIP[bhnu€Ž¤“Āåō &,;IP[d|‚ˆŽ•›”س¼ĆĪŁßåšłH”7Læööō JE ū¬u†   ’ to negotiating payments view:8 š½˜’ Main Model View*( ¼×ņR:’  0(Ź ’rŹdņŹ 0ĮŹ"*( ¼Į©h(€€€€€€  0A ’ k dų 0³"*( Ģ³8w!(’€€€€€€ 63 ŗ^H ’’’€Title PageVR 4`w ’’’€Environmental Ethic & Payment Expectation>: H_> ’’’€Output & Controls61 Ļ_D ’ ’’€CommentsŠ… ”Ž! ’’’€ Press H to see all components and links on this page or to hide all but key model components:8 _^Z ’’’€Main Model ViewB= ī`8 ’’’€Negotiating PaymentsRN šbl’’’€Banking: Payments, Penalties, Payouts @¤`@->@”“:6 I‡B’’’€ More Controls63 Š‰A’ ’’€ Pink Noise œ %”@"’*( Ūo ’€€€€€€ " +bĖ’’’’ ^\ ™va<   ’ to envirnomental ethic and payment expectation view@{N@JD@ī% 0Iį ’%"§Ś%dFŚ 0Ś"*( lśh(’€€€€€€ " &+āH’’’’  ÜŻč5*( lšĖ=’€€€€€€ *( ģ—:’€€€€€€ )(@6¾*(@!*( Ü‘$[ ’€€€€€€ " -+»Ū’’’’ *( < \G; ’€€€€€€ " /+-ż’’’’ œõ $+29?EKVagm…—ÆŗÅĖÖH”7LæłłōÜ*( ź¦:’  hV$" @Õų’  Ü dPI ģ ~č<  œ ¶ĒC@8Š@Ā@6*( ü pėV’€€€€€€ *( ܍Bc&’€€€€€€  @ąō @ĀFD Šr’Ą to environmental ethic view@čFD Oœq to negotiating payment view@–4FC Åź’Adjustments for absolute level of payments*( ŪŠ’ *( ģ¾Ä:’€€€€€€ @*( ¦%U!’€€€€€€ @:lų #0>IT_ju‚œ§²÷+9HYn}ˆ–·ĘŃęH”7Læłłōń63 Įüwѝ<0,Category_of_Ecosystem_Us.+ d æüÆŠ—<0,Ecosystem_Status2. Ž ą¦x՜<0,Environmental_Ethic61 ˆ “§°֙<0,Payments_and_Penalties*( œ˜ˆ[ ’€€€€€€ *( Üšü[ ’€€€€€€ *( ü•R& ’€€€€€€ *( ģƒ‰S ’€€€€€€ *( ,}ęx’€€€€€€ 2- Š Ixɜ<0,OK_Profitabilities*( ¼‡ŠU ’€€€€€€ :6 Ä ĀI±ș<0,OK_Payments_/_Penalties_per*( ˆy- ’€€€€€€ *( ŒÓ; ’€€€€€€   šō¬/’ This is normally turned on (1): increasing environmental status will decrease the need for payments. If it is turned off (0) then payments will continue to be made at the normal rate regardless of the status of the environment.63 o¦H ’’’€Title PageVR éØw ’’’€Environmental Ethic & Payment Expectation>: ’§H’’’€Output & Controls61 ˜§D ’ ’’€Comments:8 ¦Z ’’’€Main Model ViewB= §§C ’’’€Negotiating PaymentsRN M§a ’’’€Banking: Payments, Penalties, Payouts:6 üĶB’’’€ More Controls*( ģŒžT ’€€€€€€ 63 ™ĪA’ ’’€ Pink Noise‚ ˜p ’ ’’ Note: Noise can be random normal or random uniform. Click here to see noise component.:7 ™Ķ7 ’’€ restricted by:*( šY ’€€€€€€ RP 4Č ’’€click here to change these on next page*( œœZ’€€€€€€ ų &@Wp~Š—„²ĮĻåõ#8?FMT[bir{…›„¬³¼ÅŠŁąēīų’#,5>ELSZahw‹•ŸØ³¹ÄĖŅŁßåėńü '.5<CLV`irH”7Læōōō{rp c’KÕ Directly Add Temporary Change to Fraction of Ecosystem Services Chargedfd @EŃ Directly Add Temporary Change to Damaging Use ProfitabilityZW g’ Ų Directly Add Temporary Change to Penalty Ratesb] ":Ņ Directly Add Temporary Change to Environmental Ethic63 t®‚üњ<0,Category_of_Ecosystem_Us.+ V0½żŠ—<0,Ecosystem_Status2. @‚Ŗ„ü՚<0,Environmental_Ethic61 ųL«¾żÖ™<0,Payments_and_Penalties2- :M†üɜ<0,OK_Profitabilities:6 †źMæżČ™<0,OK_Payments_/_Penalties_per63 ˆūH ’’’€Title PageVR ūw ’’’€Environmental Ethic & Payment Expectation>: ūP ’’’€Output & Controls61 ±ŽūD ’ ’’€Comments:8 -ūZ ’’’€Main Model ViewB= ĄŽūC ’’’€Negotiating PaymentsRN fŽūa ’’’€Banking: Payments, Penalties, Payouts ģŲV(’ üÉä’j!’ œzé’I’ ,šA \:&W ÜEW3  ü!#"  @¬顀Ą "  @Ć2Ą€Ą &$ @±dźUĄ€Ą *( @?xM©.ŹĄ€Ą *( œ˜„[ ’€€€€€€ &$ @)ŲēĄ€Ą  ŻM ¶s3 "  @sōĄ€Ą "   @z9Ą€Ą *( Œp? " # @ ’  ,ÉĖž< <‡’* ’M’3 $ \€Õž' L„.’3  ¼ˆ’=" '* @āV’Ą€Ą &$&* @Ū.’ Q’Ą€Ą &$%* @’óž’Ą€Ą " )* @IN’Ą€Ą " (* @@õžĄ€Ą " * @r¢’Ą€Ą  ¤Ž4% ,Oį) <Īß5 LPü' ’ \Ż„C lŪÄ2 :6 ĆūO’’’€MORE Controls&$21 @¢&¶uĄ€Ą &$31 @ų.š`Ą€Ą &$41 @LK Ą€Ą &$51 @rˆA›Ą€Ą " 61 @ZøĄ€Ą *( ģ$P =@āö’*( üžN’€€€€€€  ¬ēM1 ģž¾b ÜDG@@ĻB@@jVA@@i£?A@ ³*( Ģ—-’ " GA @’ *( | ¾’O " I= @„×’’  œ…Ėž< ¼C’> ¬NM’:  Ü<Õž; Ģ@.’:  ŒŁˆ’=" MP @žV’Ą€Ą &$LP @—.’ĒQ’Ą€Ą &$KP @»óžÓ’Ą€Ą " OP @N’Ą€Ą " NP @üõžĄ€Ą " P= @.¢’Ą€Ą Üó *18CNT]ciou{†‘—“ĮĶč"-3AWgu„•Ŗ¹ĒŅŪäķų (.;H”7LæųųōA*( ÜSĀ2 *( 0Ę ’ *( ĢHk9   \­ēQ \ĻĒ "*( ¼Ļė0( *( l;5  ¦Ē" DńĒ’’’’ Ąļ—] ø*( Lg  *( Œ&  @x½@Ī†ZV ļpO’ (pink noise formulation is from Sterman 2001)2. ģóX€<0,Noise_White_Uniform., ńX–<0,noise_pink_detailjf ²;B"’€ Monotype Corsivachange to zero for no "noise"nj £ :<’’ĄArialclick here to return to main view*( \­’€€€€€€ ķ€@ üO/V/*( Ü•Ń9 ’€€€€€€ @³ 63 ¬+H ’’’€Title PageVR &-w ’’’€Environmental Ethic & Payment Expectation>: -,> ’’’€Output & Controls61 ©,9 ’ ’’€Comments:8 Q+Z ’’’€Main Model ViewB= ą*< ’’’€Negotiating PaymentsRN ‡.a ’’’€Banking: Payments, Penalties, Payouts:6 /UB’’’€ More Controls63 «V/ ’ ’’ Pink Noise*( <<†/ " '@VĄ€Ą " '@ÅÕĄ€Ą " '@ץ€Ą ( '@~“Ą€Ą *( \pŁ’€€€€€€ " ,'@X³Ą€Ą JH ¬—mš Arial" '@[€@ .@Ć•2- óż\Š<0,Noise_White_Normal@]yŌ÷ 'huā)z…æŅų,q•Ė× Ov «Ź’ #3APav“ĮŠåōJUvŸŗŌ$9‰²ŃÜ/mx„“6FQˆ£Į  , 7 ^ j x ƒ Į š  X l ” “ » Ę - c Š • ±   6 A r ˜ £ ® Ö å   D u € ’ H”7L搐ōÉ &" n‡A’REGARDING" ć‡<’COMMENT*( œ _²P’€€€€€€  Č6’As modeled here benefits for environmental services are viewed as being paid for actual changes in land use and not merely direct payments to families etc. So payments are viewed as an added income component of friendly land use. 2- ^d’’ ?? 1²Æ O’As presently modeled increasing environmental status decreases the urgency for making payments for environmental services (and this effect can be turned off). However, there is no feedback from the community level of environmentalism although such feedback is possible: that is, the need for continued payments in an effort to raise community awareness might be an issue that should be added to the model.ęį łRÅ7’Obviously there is some question as to what is the highest level of environmental commitment. Another complete model might be used to examine what factors limit, or enhance, environmental commitment.2- h’’ ?? 2B@ ž÷B’Another unmodeled link is that between the community's understanding of the environmental services provided and their level of environmental support. Here the proposed link would include feedback from both the value of services provided as well as from the cost of providing alternate services.*( l dÄN’€€€€€€ ęā ųŽĢ7’Within this model it is assumed that the provision of payments for environmental services create an expectation of payment, and that this expectation can be dampened by high levels of environmentalism.JE fßN!’underlying cultural environmental commitment” ļāą7’Related to the above is this unmodeled component which reflects the underlying environmental commitment of the culture.ĪŹ ėaŠ5’There is also a link from expected payment to current payments. This represents the negotiating abilities of the resource users in working out environmental services contracts.  śVŪ7’It is possible that a smooth over a very long time might be appropriate here since we often assume that in the "old days" there was a high level of environmental ethic. Nevertheless it may be true that some cultures did not have such an ethic.Ž‰ 茩<’As currently modeled payment level is decided by the model user as a fraction of the level of services provided.ÖŌ łĀ,’Nevertheless, keep in mind that the VALUE of the services, and costs to replace services will often accrue in other areas, so this potential link is not always obvious in the real world..* ę‰z’UPDATED COMMENTS " ėlą7’€€€ In the current model penalty payments are added to the payments. This should be changed so total payments are not changed by penalties.... but penalties are used to make the payments, with the balance coming from payments for services received.ŗ¶ Ü#±,’In the current model payments for enhancement do not diminish payments received by friendly users. Perhaps these should be subtracted from those payments. š— ×܏,’Possible inclusion: Awareness of value of services provided and the effect of that on expectation of payments and negotiations*( =Ū’’’ zv ¾„ +’User may wish to investigate increasing penalties as damaging use increases. See Saeed 1985?*( Gz ’’’ zu ÖEČ!’Does each successive unit of decay would cost more to restore than the previous one, (Saeed)ŅĪ §^³L’Consider if / how this idea needs to be incorporated..... maybe not.... more in relation to effect on env rebuilding when env is degraded. but should already be taken into account.63 2, ’’’€ Title PageVR GQ ’’’€ Environmental Ethic & Payment Expectation>: ć/ ’’’€Output & Controls61 ~D’ ’’€Comments:8 ŖH ’’’€ Main Model ViewB= Ģ0 ’’’€ Negotiating PaymentsRN GE ’’’€ Banking: Payments, Penalties, Payoutsrm <w!’€Ą Now environemental ethic is related to the long term smoothed value.¶³ °e¤,’€Ą As below... there is now a collection of all payments which affects the negotiation of new payments. The difference is stored in a "bank":5 •³7 ’€€ Need to add?RM •xY’€@ Need to incorporate option for this?:6 ä;B’’’€ More Controls63 ~9A’ ’’€ Pink Noisero o‡!’Overly tight relationship between payouts and payments made for environmental servicesŖ§ 0§,’OK. How about changing the model so that the link is not quite so tight. Look at the banking portion. Now the outflows is linked to inflow, *( < O1I’€€€€€€ ‚} éA’,’NOTE: need to make this compatable with a zero expectation so that a new expectation can be non-zerob` Ļ9x!’so the new expectation cannot have only a multiplier of current payment>< W¦H’the calculation of effects on ethicjf ē¬}!’should we be doing this based on payments per unit rather that total payouts?fb Ų$\!’’ Investigate the smooth idea, but probably not necessary. ŹČ Ē»“,’€Ą These calculations have been changed. They are now based on payout per unit ,and can be compared to overall profitability for the feedback to effect on ethic.FA •8)’    ’’’’go to Research Questions*( L VšF’€€€€€€ RM ×{a ’€ĄThis calculation has been changed. >; Ķūę@’€Ą initial expected payout is now based on the change in profitability needed to match damaging use profitability -- _including_ the effect of penalties. This does not, yet, include the idea that this changeover requires more than just matching the damaging use profitability.¢ž ßó ,’Previously, initialed expected payment was equal to the difference between damaging use profitability and friendly use profitability.zx •’’ but could this be a smooth of inflow over a longer period (but, units problem).*( ģHåP’€€€€€€ ęć üŻ7’In the model this is a constant. However, it is possible that as financial security drops this may also drop. People may be more willing to switch more redily when another use becomes more profitableb_ Üś`!’’’ Probably not critical at this time... but investigate.öņ ˜ Ü5’’ Better... set a cap on payouts per unit as a fraction of friendly use profitability. Maybe 50% of that profitability. Or 150% of basic difference between friendly and damaging vs friendly use profit.*( œ \% E’€€€€€€ ²® !3 Ü+’currently payouts rise to very high levels when number of friendly units drops toward zero. In reality there should be some cap on payouts per unit.:6 ,’ ’’€ More Comments’Ž ‡ öU’Because the payouts are determined by desires of ecofriendly resource users, this feedback needs to be revised. Perhaps better to use some of the accumulated bank funds for resource improvement. Note that "improvement" can only speed up the attainment of current potential, but cannot (as now written) change the potential , since that is determined by resource use type.rp K”’€@ For example when population grows (e.g. use exponential growth of 1.5%)>< ķ` o’€Ą OK has been changed*( Ür‹ y’€€€€€€ ŚÕ œ ą:’Because of changes made below, this flow is now bidirectional, BUT the enhancements to environment should only be effective during positive change or could make a negative change positive.je yō w!’Perhaps these are more sensibly viewed as additive, rather than multipliers.vq “ł )’But, as modeled, enhancement can only help to get the ecosystem to its current potential&! Ķ Ŗ]’€Ą IN THIS version: feedback from direct payments for enhancement has been ELIMINATED. Only the extra feedback from ethic is included. Extra funds for enhancement are excluded from (or included within) the concept of payment to change resource uses.*( l kŻ : ’€€€€€€ VR Žš ”&’If initial ethic is set to zero the model gives zeros....*( \ ij =’€€€€€€ š• ėO¤)’’ This needs to be investigated because it could lead to a collapse of the system as financial security drops..* Žń \’?? Not important?63 öv ©’see the more comments page*( , ` f!’€€€€€€ öń ł Ó7’As currently included this component is based on the ratio of environmental ethic to long-term environmental ethic. His environmental ethic approaches zero this component becomes fixed at a positive value above one.ŗ¶ ˆ į-’The initial intent was that if environmental ethic was below the long term level than there would be a positive (above one) effect on expectation of payment.Ŗ¦ öģ Ö.’However, as environmental ethic approaches zero the ratio approaches zero and this value approaches a minimum above one number in the lookup.ņķ Ńp v’We might assume that as both approach zero the ratio apporches one, but not so. Also the approach to zero is more appropriate anyway since it agrees with the expected outcome: low ethic raises desire of payment.NL cEg!’Changing amount of resource under each type of use.žœ ėH¦,’As originally modeled the damaging use produces NO environmental benefits. Thus removing damaging use has no effect on benefits! ~{ Ā:ˆ!’Might be better to assign some minimal benefit to this use so no use can be an even bigger "evil". ^„(’*( | \TP’€€€€€€  ÕGŪ7’The idea was that having payments meet expectations would have a positive effect on ethic, however this is not reasonable since not having the point 0,1 will cause an unrealistic constant rise in ethic when payout expectations are met. ŽŒ į8›,’Perhaps the function should allow the buildup of ethic even when payments meet expectations, rather than be neutralÖÓ Ō³¼3’€Ą We will assume (for the time being) that 'neutral' effect corresponds to the idea that adequate payments are sufficient to maintain current levels of environmental ethic.š˜ “÷—,’€Ą No. Sufficient that users base expectations on the amount of money being collected for environmental services.*( ģrÓC!’€€€€€€ nj Ū¹’As modeled, payments collected are related to the value of the services provided.FD [Ų\’However, the value of these services is external to the model. How is the value of these services determined. In reality, the value of these services is related to the cost of providing them. Thus, the payouts made to encourage should, in part, determine the cost of these environmental services.NL Üßy!’How might this idea be incorporated into the model.zu öpu!’€Ą I have decided that this concept is not needed in this version of the model.*( tÆF!’€€€€€€ Ā¾ ŗĶ2’If the model is run without expectation of payments, and without any collection of money, the difference in the profit levels of each still create a expected payout!–“ ĀÆ{6’€ Somehow the effect of profit difference must be in effect only if payouts are expected in the first place.*( }›;!’€€€€€€ *( Ü|ą9’€€€€€€ ž™ ģ°¤,’Build-up and degredation happens at the same rate in these stocks. It may be worthwhile to have degradation happen more rapidly:6 ā¤G’Not implemented at this time.ŖØ ]¦,’Also the Total agreed payouts should be zero if there is not intention of having payout in the first place.... i.e. if we turn off collections.*( lv>=’€€€€€€ ¢ž Ē%.’€ Similar need for total agreed payouts. These should be zero if both penalties and payments are actively set to zero.Ā½ Š„†B’€ However, if zero collections occurs in the course of a model run, then the effect is entirely different since there would be expectation of payment.*( Ķ n!’€€€€€€ FD ÕJ“„’€ has been added to the modelŚ× ±Ŗ‘6„ ’€Note: These comments describe some issues that came up as the model was being developed. These are not complete and are included for interest only. See also "more comments" (6L\jyŠŸ®¼ĪŻč*Fn£¼ŠüT~Ż4?P[H”7Læō±&" ĀMA’REGARDING" ąO<’COMMENT.* EMz’UPDATED COMMENTS 63 ĀĻH ’’’€Title PageVR Ļw ’’’€Environmental Ethic & Payment Expectation>: UŠ> ’’’€Output & Controls61 ŽŠA ’ ’’€Comments:8 YŠH ’’’€Main Model ViewB= ąĻB ’’’€Negotiating PaymentsRN •Ōo ’’’€Banking: Payments, Penalties, Payouts:6 CB’’’€ More Controls63 ŹA’ ’’€ Pink NoiseFA šÜ8)’    ’’’’go to Research Questions:6 kŪ@'’ ’’€More Comments*( \ӆ:’€€€€€€  €”ķ9’Was not linked to number of units, since those were assumed to be fixed. However, in a more complex model this will have to be changed. Each of several types of use could each have an env integrety level as well as a number of units.nl t’„"’for now environmental status is a max value per unit times the max number of units.ž› ncœ.’€Ą But may be better to use a max value of status for each use which is multiplied by number of units under each use.ŅĻ mĘ9’€Ą Changed in this version: Maximum ecosystem status is now a function of the number of units under each type of use and the environmental integrety of each type of use.b_ n0„’’€ Ideas of interest to those working with similar modelsNK Žp"’direct effect of payments on ecosystem enhancement®Ŗ a­.’This was viewed as not necessary in the model as its effect here was not really relavant to the issue at hand. It is a different type of action.ZU `%w"’That effect has been removed from this version of the model.*( \ »@’€€€€€€ ÖÓ 5×Ń9’What determines the initial expected payout? Here I originally assumed is that the initial expectation is based on knowledge that payments are being received for environmental services.¦” 0Y„.’However, it is also reasonable that initial expectations are based on the income needed to switch over to environmentally friendly uses.zu OįE’This is connected to the question of how payouts are viewed by the recipients. Herein payouts were primarily determined by knowledge about the collection of payments for for environmental services. The direct link to profitability of other activities was not considered at this point in the model, but rather in the switch to other resource uses.ZW N„įU’€Ą It seems possible that the model could be set up in such a way that there could be two factors affecting desired payment: 1) the knowledge of how much is being collected as payments for environmental services, and 2) the difference between damaging use profitability and eco-friendly uses profitability*( Ł J"’€€€€€€ B? ‹`’€Ą WAS ADDED TO THE MODEL*( øØ+’expected payoutVS V™E’€Ą So, under the new design expectation of payment is based on the knowledge that payments are being made for environmental services with an additional requirement that, other things being equal, a payment should be at least as big as the difference in the profitability of damaging and friendly uses.˜ -=KZk€­ĖŁģ$3N^Ÿ¾OitŠ½ś!B]ˆĶśLp“®Šč&]hœ¹ņE_H”7Læffōs63 xAH ’’’€Title PageVR ņCw ’’’€Environmental Ethic & Payment Expectation>: łB> ’’’€Output & Controls61 €A= ’ ’’€Comments:8 AZ ’’’€Main Model ViewB= ®AB ’’’€Negotiating PaymentsRN VBa ’’’€Banking: Payments, Penalties, Payouts:6 ųjB’’’€ More Controls63 ƒkA’ ’’€ Pink Noise>; M4’ ’’€Research Questionsvs Ø:!’What is the level of payment, if any, above which decreases in environmental ethics occur?61 y±/’QuestionJE ō³Y’Associated Idea / HypothesisŽŁ ?™H’Up to some point payments can increase an interest in environmental issues, but if excessive, such payments will be seen as merely a means of making money, and will degrad environmental ethic.:8 9·2’Alternate Viewsje au!’Environmental ethics are independent of payments for environmental services.>9 «³6’Needed Research:ž µF—Y’Field research which examines how payments have influenced people's (payment recipient's) views about environmental issues. Ideally this would be a pre payment / post payment (e.g. five or more years into a program) comparison.zu šXC’What are the factors which determine an expectation of payout on the part of resource users? ÷4­V’As currently described herein, expectation of payment is based primarily on the knowledge that payments are available and the amount of payments being collected for ecosystem services. This expectation is modified (lowered) if environmental ethic is high."  l?‘h’Expectation of payment is also based on the need for the payment.... the relative difference in profitability between the two resource use types. However, if the difference is large then the users will switch to the other use... if payments are not forthcoming.fb Ģģr!’How do they determine that level? What factors influence that decision?*( ¼°u’ *( Ąäu’ *( »“u’ ŹČ vś„F’Expectation of payment may also be determined, in part, by the knowledge of the value of the services provided (i.e. the value of clean water compared to a filtration plant).ņī üĒH„’There is an assumption then that payouts to friendly users, although based on the profit differences between damaging and eco-friendly uses, may be less than that difference due to the effects of environmentalism.NL il€„’Payments will always increase environmental ethics.JF e²‚’Payments never increase environmental ethics.‚} Āx~0’What level of payments is actually needed to prevent resource users from switching to damaging uses?jh ¼ z!’Determine what factors affect the level of payouts expected by resources users.Ŗ§ š÷‘C’What are the algorithms that will best induce resource users to switch to friendly activities when the damaging use profitability is higher.   łµM„’As currently described here payments are based on the desires of resource users, and on the profitability difference between eco-friendly and damaging uses. However, switch over to eco-friendly uses is also influenced by environmental ethics.²® ÷¤„,„’However, the effect of ethic on switchover only occurs when ethic is increasing and that tends to occur when switchover has already started to occur.Šˆ tń+„’Is there some additional approach that can induce this beginning switchover more efficiently when it is needed?ŗø |g™:„’Could an additional payment to be made at times when switchover is zero and damaging use profitability is significantly higher than eco-friendly profitability?ŽŒ ³īˆ3’As above, what are the influences which cause, or might cause, resource users to switch to eco-friendly activities?Š‡ ³Zƒ:’Are financial incentives the only possible inducement for this switch over? What are the other possibilities?jf ¤Ls.’How does participation in eco-friendly activities affect environmental ethic?†ƒ Y‡,’Increases in participation in environmental friendly activities causes an increase in environmental ethic.^\ ]Mh)’Such participation does not necessarily affect environmental ethic.ŹČ ©RÆ7’Research to measure possible changes in environmental ethic after participation in eco-friendly activities. Would need to be separated from any possible effect of payments .*( ¼ču’ ŚÖ š)¹7„’When eco-friendly profit is high enough users switch to that use. In making this switchover environmental ethic is also increased, and this leads additional switch-over to eco-friendly use.*( µHu’ ĪĢ ų³ø,„’It is not clear who is switching over. Who gains environmental ethic by switching. The implication here is that it the community as a whole, and that is the intent of the model.rn ō©o,„’Ethic is a community idea, whereby individuals in a 'community' influence each other.āß ƒ»®G„’Environmental ethic is primarily an individual idea. There is little influence between one individual and another. The influence on switching would be within resource units owned by an individual.ro ’­æ„’The difference between profitability of damaging and ecofriendly use is also a factor.ÖŅ öŲ›X„’How is environmental ethic formed and maintained? What is the role of the community and the individual in building environmental ethic? 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‡<•¬ &®ŗ¦įC‡¬'‡¼ '‡¼B•ü &®ŗ•¼ ®ŗ#•%•¼ ®ŗ%• •Ģ ®ŗ$•®ŗ'•Œ‡Ģ '‡¼•&øGø®ŗ•ü ±®ŗŗ•l  ‡Ģ •L&®ŗ•'•L ‡<•l &®ŗ¦? ‡Ģ r• ®ŗ²¦±¦$¦€?±¦€?°±¦€>±¦±¦Äx½>±¦n÷ŗ>±¦f/?±¦wō#?±¦Ō™??±¦ģ£_?±¦€?±¦€? ‡<•ģ &®ŗ•,$•  ‡¼•L¹&ø¦@E ‡¼•<¹&ø¦śD ‡¼•l¹&ø¦€> ‡¼•\¹&ø¦€= ‡¼‰øšš±š±š&š&Gš$š'š±š œ‰øšš±š&š&Gš$š'š±š œä H”7Læīīō&Internally defined simulation time.jThe underlying profitability of eco-damaging activities uninfluenced by penalties or other influences.VTemporary fractional change in damaging use profitability to be added by model user.ŚThe maximum penalty rate permitted as a fraction of damaging use profitability. Regardless of the environmental services lost, penalties will never be higher than this fractional rate (i.e. 10% of profitability).jThe fraction of ecosystem services value that will be charged to recipients of those ecosystem services.ŠThe fraction of the value of ecosystem services that is paid back to resource users who are using environmentally friendly activitiesBA test input allowing the extra addition of environmental ethic2length of time for implementation of added ethicVfractional change to ethic due to outside influence, training, coomunity action etc.ŚThe maximum penalty rate permitted as a fraction of damaging use profitability. Regardless of the environmental services lost, penalties will never be higher than this fractional rate (i.e. 10% of profitability).¾Current fractional charge as a fraction of profitability of damaging activities. This is a cap on penalty payments if we believe that the full amount of lost services cannot be recovered.>\!proportion of use that is damaging\!effect on penalty tax.The mean time needed for ecosystem recoveryŽAlthough services are always available it does take time for the environment to produce those services. That is, changes in the environment might not be reflected in the services provided until some time has elapsed.RTime needed for avialability of funds to influence payouts to resource users.RThe time needed for decreases due to dropping environmental need to have effect.6Time needed for decrease in payments to be accepted>Time needed for expectation of higher payouts to be realizedrAverage time that would be required for the profitability difference to be absorbed into the payments desired.bTypical time needed for environmentalism to change. This can be modified by various factors.bTypical time needed for environmentalism to change. This can be modified by various factors.FThe length of time over which long-term environmentalism is created^The time over which expectation of payment is formulated in the minds of community membersbTypical time needed for environmentalism to change. This can be modified by various factors.jThe amount of time it takes for changes in apparent profitability to influence resource users to switch.bThe amount of time it takes for changes in apparent profitability to influence resource users.JThe amount of time needed to switch from damaging to friendly activities>The amount of time needed to switch to damaging activitiesNtime needed to readjust environmentalizm to the current financial situation¶Look up to phase in expectations of payment if that is desired (change second x-axis variable to desired end of phase in time e.g. 2 or 5) \!time difference\!expectation effectŹThe annual value of each net of benefit provided from the ecosystem. Note: as modeled here these units of benefits are provided by the whole ecosystem in question, not by each unit of the resource.ŠNormal profitability of eco-friendly activities prior to taking into account payouts for environmental services, or environmental ethic.jThe fractional increase in profit required in order for switches to another use type to be initiated.zFraction of lost environmental services that we wish to recover from resource users carrying out damaging activities.ŅThe date when expectations of payment start to play a role. If there are no payouts it is possible (likely?) that there is no expectation of payout. Usually this is the time that payments are implemented.ęThis is normally turned on (1): increasing environmental status will decrease the need for payments. If it is turned off (0) then payments will continue to be made at the normal rate regardless of the status of the environment."White noise input to the pink noise process. The user specifies the mean, standard deviation, and noise seed. The white noise input is the standard normal distribution, scaled so that the standard deviation of the resulting pink noise is equal to the parameter specified by the user.~Change in the pink noise value; Pink noise is a first order exponential smoothing delay of the white noise input.öWhite noise input to the pink noise process. The user specified the mean, standard deviation, and noise seed. The white noise input is drawn from a uniform distrib ution, then scaled to yield the correct standard deviation for the pink noise.&The mean of the pink noise process.:Pink Noise is first-order autocorrelated noise. Pink noise provides a realistic noise input to models in which the next random shock depends in part on the previous shocks. The user can specify the correlation time. The mean and standard deviation are specified by the user. (based directly on Sterman 2000).6The correlation time constant for the pink noise.6The standard deviation of the pink noise process.öThe noise seed determines which sequence of realizations for the random process are used. Simulations with the same noise seed will yield the same sequence, so different simulations can be compared. Changing the see changes the realizations.bThese changes are in addition to the normal change that occurs as resource use patters improve.^The maximum amount of ecological integrety that could associated with a unit of resource.RThe initial value of the environmental integrity of the ecosystem in question–Changing ecosystem status due to ecosystem recovers as determined by its normal recovery rate plus the effect of ecosystem enhancement activitiesBThe current environmental integrity of the ecosystem in questionjMaximum possible benefits to be derived from the ecosystem when the ecosystem is in perfect condition6The maximum environmental integrity of the ecosystemRThe rate at which ecosystem benefits increase given changes in ecosystem status.V\!environmentalism compared to long term 'average'\!effect on improving env statusBThe value of environmental services that are no longer available because of degradation of the ecosystem. Note that at times, because some environmental services can linger after the ecosystem is degraded, actual services may rarely be greater than potential services. (e.g. if ecosystem is suddenly brought to zero).šFor some environmental services there is a dissipation of the services: four example in the case of groundwater overpumping can dissipate that resource.–Environmental services and benefits being provided by the ecosystem. As normally used these benefits do not include harvested items such as timber.vA function describing the relationship between ecosystem integrity and the benefits provided by the ecosystem\!\!ŠThe monetary value of the benefits provided by the ecosystem -- this is the total value of ecosystem services provided by the ecosystem.VThe pool of funds available for use in making payments for environmental services2Excess amount of funds collected or overspent.6Decreases in payments accepted by resource users.vThe changing amount of payouts caused by the expectation of users who have adopted to carry out friendly activities.&Total amount of payouts expected.²Changes in agreed payouts due to the availability of payments made for environmental services. The change is more rapid (i.e. has more influence ) as payments collected drop.īAs payments drop the level of these payments becomes more important in determining the new agreed payout. \!all payments collected per unit / average profitability per unit\!fractional decrease in time needed to complete negotiation‚Changes in payouts due to dropping environmental need. As environmental need decreases the need for payments also decreases.ZPayouts made for environmental services resulting from good management of the ecosystem.ZSwitch to turn off all expectation. Make this value zero to turn all expectation off.Changes to the expected payout level related to the profitability difference between damaging and eco-friendly resource uses. This change only has an effect when damaging uses are more profitable and the payout recipients desire that that profitability be matched.2The rate at which expectation of payment changesRDifference between damaging use profitability and ecofriendly use profitability†The current expectation of payout for environmental services on the part of people carrying out environmentally friendly activities.rThe effective that payments for environmental services will have on the existing level of environmental ethic.Bcollective payments received compared to expectation of paymentsfA new level of environmentalism expected after the influence of payments for environmental services*The destruction of environmental ethicJThe possible amount of change in environmental ethic which could occur>Changing environmental ethic due to the effect of payments.īThe effect environmentalism (environmental ethic ) will have on the expected level of payouts for environmental services. In general we would expect of that high levels of environmentalism would result in lower expectation of payout.*The pending new expectation of payment.>The long term level of environmentalism in the community.RThe current long term commitment to environmental issues within the community.šA comparison of the current level of eco-friendly activities compared to the level of activities that were carried out in the relatively recent past.RChanges in environmental ethic due to changes in long term resource use pattern.ŖThe effect that excessive penalties on damaging use have on the destruction of environmental ethic. This might happen when tax rates are considered too high or unfair.ĪA lookup function which describes the effect that environmental ethic will have on expectation of payment for environmental services \!Ratio of current ethic to long term ethic\!effect on payment Dmnl The initial expectation of payments for environmental services should at least make up for the difference between profitability of damaging and friendly uses. It could be based on the profitability difference, or on the current level of payments being collected.¾A lookup function which describes the relationship between penalties on damaging uses and the distruction of environmental ethic. \!tax rate on damaging uses\!effect on destroying ethicžA lookup function describing the relationship made between payments for environmental services and the effect that such payments will have on environmental ethic \!Payment - expectation divided by normal profitability \!Effect on environmental ethicZThis payments measure is based on both payments actually received and expected paymentsfA general measure of profitability of resource use. The unweighted average value without payments.nA general measure of how important payments are with respect to profitability of the possible resource uses.¢The effect that the absolute level of payment has on change in ethic. When payments are low compared to overall profitability their effect becomes irrelevant.RA graphical function which describes the relation between the general level of payments compared to profitability and the effect that payments will have on environmental ethic. When payments are small the effect approaches zero \!mean of payments and expectations relative to average profitability\!effect on expected change in ethicJTotal number of units available. In most situations this is a constant.āA fraction used to palce a cap on the maximum payout to friendly users. It is expressed as a fraction of the basic friendly use profitability. Typically this will come into play when the number of friendly units is small.ZThe rate at which resource users are switching to environmentally friendly activities.The need for improvement in the environment.ŽAmount of money received per unit of resource for carrying out eco-friendly activities (For example: dollars per year per hectare). This payout is capped at a (fairly high) percentage of eco-friendly use profitability.NIncome required by the community from activities making use of the resource.^The profitability of friendly activities after taking into account environmental payments˜The benefits of switching are based on the expected increase in income compared to some threshhold value which would make switching worthwhile.rThe apparent profitability of ecofriendly activities after taking into account the value of environmental ethic.vThe amount of income per resource unit which should be exceeded to make swintching resource activities worthwhile.fThe effect that environmentalism has on the rate of switching to environmentally friendly activitiesfThe uncorrected profitability of damaging activities as effected by optional user supplied inputs:initial number of units of resource under damaging usesJInitial number of units of resource under environmentally friendly uses^The financial benefits which users get if they switch to environmentally damaging activitiesvThe amount of income per resource unit which should be exceeded to make swintching resource activities worthwhile.BAmount of money collected from recipients of ecosystem servicesNThe amount of money paid for environmental services that have been provided.öThe fraction of normal profitability actually paid as penalty weighted by the fraction of land uses that are taxed (i.e. damaging uses). It is hypothesized that excessivly high tax rates will cause a weakening of overall environmental ethic.:Penalty payments collected for damaging resource use.žA lookup function which describes the relationship between environmentalism and its effect on switching to environmentally friendly uses \!environmental ethic compared to long term ethic\!effect on profitability needed to switch to friendly uses Dmnl"A look up function describing how dropping level of environmental need might lessen the need for payments. If the level of environmental need is less, then the urgency of making payments is lessened as well. \!Level of environmental need\!Effect on payments for environmental servicesŠThe effective at the need for environmental approve meant will have on the desirability of making payments for environmental servicesbProfitability of environmentally damaging activities after taking into account penalty paymentsęA table function describing the relationship between potential financial benefits and the affect on users switching to environmentally friendly uses.\!f of change in profitability compared to threshold\!effect on switching DmnlRThe amount of penalty charged for each unit of environmentally damaging activity^The overall level of income in the community -- total amount from both resource use typesnThe penalty which resource managers would want to charge ignoring the ability of the resource users to payņA lookup function describing the relationship between benefits received and the actual switch to environmentally damaging activities.\!Ratio of expected increase in profit to threshold needed for changeover\!effect on switching uses DmnlNThe overall level of income from damaging activities within the communitybThe overall level of income in the community resulting from environmentally friendly activitiesRThe rate at which resource users switch to environmentally damaging activitiesFThe amount of environmentally damaging activities currently underwayVThe amount of environmentally friendly resource use activities currently underway.ŠA maximum penalty charge that resource users could be expected to pay based on the profitability of the activities they are carrying outfNumber of users (e.g. farmer families) supported by activities within the environment in question^A community wide measure of income availability compared to that needed from the resource.žA multiplier describing the relative cost of replacing services that previously had been provided by the ecosystem. Typically this will be more than 1.0.RThe minimum amount of money required from the resource by each "user" each year6Adjusting underlying ethic to financial realitiesvThis represents the current underlying strength of environmental ethic as modified by immediate monetary concernsBthe relation between current and long term environmental ethic*The initial value of environmental ethicvEffect of monetary need on the resource users environmentalism\!Relative monetary need\!Effect on environmentalism" Simulation Control ParametersTDifference between model time and the time when expectations become important.&The final time for the simulation.&The initial time for the simulation..The frequency with which output is stored.&The time step for the simulation.Lķ€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö AČBČB€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö @€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€@€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö@E@E@E€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö@E€ö€ö€ö€öĶĢĢ=€ö€ö€?€ö`žD€ö@€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö?€öśDHBHB€ö€ö@?€ö€ö€?€ö€ö€ö€ö@ČA @ @@@ @@€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€üD€?€öff¦?įC€>ĶĢL=ĄżD’D’DĄżD€ö€ö@@@@A @@@€?€? @@@ @ @@@€=@@Ą?@@ A @’D€? ×£=š™>€ö€?€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö€ö w 8'.75;6AL TWb mt{€)… ™¦ 9³»:ĆÅBĒŹC”7LæŅŅōĀu<Āõ<ĶĢL=ĶĢĢ=ĶĢL>]¤˜>OYÅ>?€??Hį:?Rø^?{n?Hįz?€?4Š?,+™?Ą?@@€? ?Ą?ffę?¤S@ff@@@€?33“? ?ĶĢ¬?źģ“?š™¹?Ą?ĮH>Gä³>0gž> ń?@?€??¤65?ø’U?_%k?Ņ¦v?€?€?·ėe>±ł>€?v‰¾?@ff¦?`<£?PS›?€?t˜C???€?XVž?ęæ?D4Ž? Ž@˜†#@%T@»a‚@ @ĶĢĢ=rS›>·{]? Ćœ?ŲGæ?üŒē?é@ø’@ @?€?XVž?ęæ?D4Ž? Ž@˜†#@%T@»a‚@ @ĶĢĢ=rS›>·{]? Ćœ?ŲGæ?üŒē?é@ø’@ @žņØ:—¬+;Ģ£;-Vł;×#<Āu<ĶĢL=Š9 ?Ņ¦6?rS[?¼n?ź^w?€?€>Äx½>f/?Ō™??€?n÷ŗ>wō#?ģ£_?€?ĻĻą; ×#<ĶĢĢ<Āõ<Ō =Ģ &=ĶĢL=)\=ĶĢĢ=1Š<ĶĢL=?½&?^÷:?DśQ?fff?€?€?YŠÜ¾ĶĢL¾@Żą½ĶĢĢ=,Ÿ>ĶĢL>,Ÿu>š™™>Ćŗį>–Ļ? SD?å`r?Ö;?@?܄W?€?š™™?ÕŹœ?š™™?¤“?€?˜n>?9?¾õ?ā­?š™>M» >¼×>(D?_y?Ń>J?€?żø=£}>ź^÷>Ž•,?ėŒg?€?€?€?Ą?@33³>?///---\\\ :GRAPH OK_Profitabilities :TITLE Effect of Ethic on Profitability :WIDTH 8 :HEIGHT 6 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR adjusted profitability of friendly activities :LINE-WIDTH 3 :VAR adjusted profitability of damaging activities :LINE-WIDTH 3 :VAR ethic effected profitability of friendly activities :LINE-WIDTH 3 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :LINE-WIDTH 3 :GRAPH OK_Use_and_Ethic :TITLE Resource Use, Ecosystem Status and Environmental Ethic :WIDTH 20 :HEIGHT 16 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :Y-MIN 0 :Y-MAX 100 :SCALE :VAR Ecosystem Status :Y-MIN 0 :Y-MAX 100 :SCALE :VAR Current Underlying Environmental Ethic :VAR Realized Environmental Ethic :GRAPH OK_Sources_and_Use_of_Funds :TITLE Sources and Use of Funds - Payments & Penalties :WIDTH 8 :HEIGHT 6 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR penalty payments collected :VAR payments collected from recipients :VAR all payments collected :VAR Total Agreed Payouts :VAR value of environmental services provided :GRAPH OK_Payments_/_Penalties_per :TITLE Payouts, Payments, and Penalties per Unit :WIDTH 20 :HEIGHT 16 :SCALE :VAR benefit payouts per unit :VAR payments collected per friendly unit :VAR actual penalty payments per unit :GRAPH Category_of_Ecosystem_Us :TITLE Category of Ecosystem Use :Y-DIV 11 :STACK-FILL 0 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :Y-MIN 0 :Y-MAX 100 :LINE-WIDTH 2 :VAR Level of Environmentally Damaging Activities :LINE-WIDTH 2 :GRAPH Ecosystem_Status :TITLE Ecosystem Status :SCALE :VAR Ecosystem Status :Y-MIN 0 :Y-MAX 100 :LINE-WIDTH 1 :GRAPH Environmental_Ethic :TITLE Environmental Ethic :Y-DIV 4 :SCALE :VAR Current Underlying Environmental Ethic :Y-MIN 0 :VAR Realized Environmental Ethic :GRAPH n_FIG_Payouts_&_Expectation :TITLE Payouts, Expected Payout, & Environmental Ethic :SCALE :VAR benefit payouts per unit :VAR Expected Payout per Unit :SCALE :VAR Current Underlying Environmental Ethic :VAR Realized Environmental Ethic :SCALE :VAR switching to friendly activities :GRAPH Payments_and_Penalties :TITLE Payments and Penalties :SCALE :VAR penalty payments collected :VAR payments collected from recipients :VAR all payments collected :VAR Total Agreed Payouts :GRAPH Financial_Security_Resou :TITLE Financial Security Resource Owner/Users :SCALE :VAR owners relative monetary security :Y-MIN 0.5 :Y-MAX 1.5 :GRAPH nFIG_Use_Status_Ethic :TITLE Eco-Friendly Use, Ecosystem Status, & Environmental Ethic :WIDTH 7 :HEIGHT 5 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :Y-MIN 0 :Y-MAX 100 :SCALE :VAR Ecosystem Status :Y-MIN 0 :SCALE :VAR Current Underlying Environmental Ethic :Y-MIN 0 :Y-MAX 4 :VAR Realized Environmental Ethic :GRAPH FIG_payments_p_unit :TITLE Penalties and Payments per Unit :SCALE :VAR benefit payouts per unit :VAR actual penalty payments per unit :GRAPH nFIG_Profitability_of_Each_Us :TITLE Profitability, Penalties, & Payments :WIDTH 7 :HEIGHT 5 :SCALE :VAR adjusted profitability of friendly activities :Y-MIN 0 :Y-MAX 200 :LINE-WIDTH 2 :VAR adjusted profitability of damaging activities :LINE-WIDTH 2 :SCALE :VAR actual penalty payments per unit :Y-MIN 0 :Y-MAX 80 :LINE-WIDTH 1 :VAR benefit payouts per unit :LINE-WIDTH 1 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :Y-MIN 0 :Y-MAX 100 :LINE-WIDTH 1 :GRAPH FIG_Cash_Flow :TITLE Cash Flow :SCALE :VAR value of environmental services provided :LINE-WIDTH 3 :VAR payments collected from recipients :LINE-WIDTH 2 :VAR penalty payments collected :LINE-WIDTH 2 :VAR all payments collected :VAR Total Agreed Payouts :VAR excess funds collected :GRAPH How_Does_Profitability_o :TITLE How Does Profitability of Damaging Use Affect Environmental Ethic :X-AXIS adjusted profitability of damaging activities :DOTS :SCALE :VAR Current Underlying Environmental Ethic :GRAPH How_Does_Prof_Affect_Da :TITLE How Does Profitability Affect Damaging Activities :X-AXIS adjusted profitability of damaging activities :DOTS :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Damaging Activities :GRAPH n_Switching_Uses_Friendly_ :TITLE Switching Uses Friendly and Damaging :SCALE :VAR switching to friendly activities :VAR increasing damaging activities :SCALE :VAR profitability of damaging activities :VAR ethic affected profitability of friendly activities :VAR adjusted profitability of damaging activities :VAR adjusted profitability of friendly activities :GRAPH nFIG_Profitability_of_Each_Us_0 :TITLE Profitability, Penalties, Payments & Eco-Services :WIDTH 7 :HEIGHT 5 :SCALE :VAR ethic affected profitability of friendly activities :Y-MIN 0 :Y-MAX 200 :LINE-WIDTH 2 :VAR adjusted profitability of damaging activities :LINE-WIDTH 2 :SCALE :VAR actual penalty payments per unit :Y-MIN 0 :Y-MAX 80 :LINE-WIDTH 1 :VAR benefit payouts per unit :LINE-WIDTH 1 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :Y-MIN 0 :Y-MAX 100 :LINE-WIDTH 1 :VAR Environmental Services :GRAPH n_FIG_Payouts_&_Expectation_2 :TITLE Payouts, Expected Payout, & Environmental Ethic :X-MIN 2010 :X-MAX 2100 :WIDTH 7 :HEIGHT 5 :SCALE :VAR benefit payouts per unit :LINE-WIDTH 3 :VAR Current Expected Payout per Unit :LINE-WIDTH 3 :SCALE :VAR Realized Environmental Ethic :LINE-WIDTH 3 :SCALE :VAR switching to friendly activities :Y-MAX 25 :LINE-WIDTH 3 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :LINE-WIDTH 3 :SCALE :VAR increasing damaging activities :Y-MAX 25 :GRAPH Profitability_and_Ethic- :TITLE Profitability and Ethic-Effected Profitability of Friendly Activities :SCALE :VAR adjusted profitability of friendly activities :VAR ethic effected profitability of friendly activities :GRAPH presentation_A_2 :TITLE Resulting Environment, Environmental Services and Environmental Ethic :SCALE :VAR Ecosystem Status :Y-MIN 0 :Y-MAX 100 :SCALE :VAR value of environmental services provided :SCALE :VAR Current Underlying Environmental Ethic :GRAPH Present_z1 :TITLE Profitability of Uses with Fluctuating Basic Profitability :SCALE :VAR profitability of damaging activities :VAR adjusted profitability of damaging activities :VAR adjusted profitability of friendly activities :VAR ethic affected profitability of friendly activities :GRAPH Payments_vs._Enviro :TITLE Is this the Effect of Payments on Environmental Status? :X-AXIS Total Agreed Payouts :Y-DIV 3 :DOTS :SCALE :VAR Ecosystem Status :GRAPH Relationship_of_total_ag :TITLE Relationship of total agreed payouts to number of units with eco-friendly use :X-AXIS Total Agreed Payouts :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :GRAPH Noise_White_Uniform :TITLE White Noise - Random Uniform :X-MIN 2020 :X-MAX 2040 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR White Noise is uni :GRAPH Noise_White_Normal :TITLE White Noise - Random Normal :X-MIN 2020 :X-MAX 2040 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR White Noise is norm :GRAPH noise_pink_detail :TITLE Pink Noise Detail :X-MIN 2020 :X-MAX 2040 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR Pink Noise :GRAPH ethic_test_1 :TITLE Ethic as Effected by Payments and Current Ethic :SCALE :VAR Current Underlying Environmental Ethic :VAR environmental ethic as influenced by payments :GRAPH LoEnvironmentally_Friendly :TITLE Three Examples with No Payouts :X-LABEL Year :WIDTH 21 :HEIGHT 14 :NO-LEGEND 7 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *2 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *3 :GRAPH GRAPH :TITLE GRAPH :SCALE :VAR Funds Available for Payouts :SCALE :VAR Total Agreed Payouts :Y-MIN -800 :Y-MAX 800 :GRAPH Fig4_rev_OK :TITLE Equal Profitability of Uses with No Payouts :X-DIV 15 :Y-DIV 4 :WIDTH 6 :HEIGHT 4.5 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :UNITS units under eco-friendly use :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *2 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *3 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *4 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *5 :GRAPH Fig5_rev_OK_Ecosystem_Status :TITLE Ecosystem Status with Equal Profitability and No Payouts :WIDTH 6 :HEIGHT 4.5 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR Ecosystem Status :UNITS ecosystem integrity :VAR Ecosystem Status :DATASET *2 :VAR Ecosystem Status :DATASET *3 :VAR Ecosystem Status :DATASET *4 :VAR Ecosystem Status :DATASET *5 :GRAPH Fig6_rev_OK :TITLE Efffect of Increased Profitability of Damaging Use :WIDTH 6 :HEIGHT 4.5 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :UNITS units under eco-friendly use :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *2 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *3 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *4 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *5 :GRAPH Fig7_rev_OK :TITLE Effect of Payouts and Value of Environmental Services :WIDTH 6 :HEIGHT 4.5 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :UNITS units under eco-friendly use :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *2 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *3 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *4 :GRAPH Fig8_rev_OK :TITLE Effect of an Earlier Start to a Payout System :WIDTH 6 :HEIGHT 4.5 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :UNITS units under eco-friendly use :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *2 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *3 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *4 :GRAPH FIG9_rev_OK :TITLE Effect of Payouts with Fluctuating Damaging Use Profitability :WIDTH 6 :HEIGHT 4.5 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :UNITS units under eco-friendly use :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *2 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *3 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *4 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *5 :GRAPH Fig10_Sources_and_Use_of_Funds_Payments :TITLE Source and Use of Funds - Payments Only :WIDTH 6 :HEIGHT 4.5 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR payments collected from recipients :LINE-WIDTH 3 :VAR Total Agreed Payouts :LINE-WIDTH 3 :VAR value of environmental services provided :LINE-WIDTH 3 :GRAPH FIG11_rev_OK :TITLE Effect of Payouts Funded Only by Penalties :X-MIN 2025 :WIDTH 6 :HEIGHT 4.5 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :UNITS units under eco-friendly use :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *2 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *3 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *4 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *5 :GRAPH Fig12_Sources_and_Use_of_Funds_pen_only_OK :TITLE Source and Use of Funds - Penalties Only :WIDTH 6 :HEIGHT 4.5 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR penalty payments collected :LINE-WIDTH 3 :VAR Total Agreed Payouts :LINE-WIDTH 3 :VAR value of environmental services provided :LINE-WIDTH 1 :GRAPH FIG13_rev_OK :TITLE Funding Payouts with Payments and Penalties :WIDTH 6 :HEIGHT 4.5 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :UNITS units under eco-friendly use :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *2 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *3 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *4 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *5 :GRAPH Fig14_soruce_and_use_of_funds_Pay_and_Pen_OK :TITLE Sources and Use of Funds - Payments & Penalties :WIDTH 6 :HEIGHT 4.5 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR penalty payments collected :LINE-WIDTH 3 :VAR payments collected from recipients :LINE-WIDTH 3 :VAR all payments collected :LINE-WIDTH 3 :VAR Total Agreed Payouts :LINE-WIDTH 3 :VAR value of environmental services provided :LINE-WIDTH 3 :GRAPH Fig15?_Profitabilities,_Payouts, :TITLE Profitabilities, Payouts, Penalties, and Ethic :SCALE :VAR adjusted profitability of damaging activities :Y-MIN 80 :VAR adjusted profitability of friendly activities :VAR ethic effected profitability of friendly activities :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :SCALE :VAR Realized Environmental Ethic :Y-MAX 5 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :Y-MAX 100 :DATASET Base No Payments inc prof dmg :GRAPH Fig15_Profitabilities,_Payouts,_ethic :TITLE Effect of Ethic on Profitability :WIDTH 7 :HEIGHT 4.5 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR adjusted profitability of friendly activities :Y-MIN 80 :LINE-WIDTH 3 :VAR adjusted profitability of damaging activities :LINE-WIDTH 3 :VAR ethic effected profitability of friendly activities :LINE-WIDTH 3 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :LINE-WIDTH 2 :GRAPH Fig16?_Graph_for_Level_of_Envir :TITLE Effect of Ethic Switchover Behavior on Eco-Friendly Use :WIDTH 6 :HEIGHT 4.5 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :UNITS units under eco-friendly use :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *2 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *3 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *4 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *5 :VAR Level of Environmentally Friendly Activities :DATASET *6 :GRAPH Fig17_Different_Effects_of_Eth :TITLE Effect of Ethic Switchover Behavior on Desired Payout :WIDTH 6 :HEIGHT 4.5 :NO-LEGEND 1 :SCALE :VAR Expected Payout per Unit :UNITS Desired Payout $(Year*units) :VAR Expected Payout per Unit :DATASET *2 :VAR Expected Payout per Unit :DATASET *3 :VAR Expected Payout per Unit :DATASET *4 :VAR Expected Payout per Unit :DATASET *5 :L<%^E!@ 1:dmp rmp w rmp pay + pen rnd 0p1 rn7 A.vdf 1:dmp rmp w rmp pay + pen rnd 0p1 rn7 B.vdf 1:dmp rmp w rmp pay + pen rnd 0p1 rn7 C.vdf 1:dmp rmp w rmp pay + pen rnd 0p1 rn7 D.vdf 1:dmp rmp w rmp pay + pen rnd 0p1 rn7 E none.vdf 9:xxx 18:w wo ethic effect.vsc 20:PES V27 EXP 20060427.lst 15:0,0,0,0,0,0 19:100,0 27:3, 34:0, 4:Time 5:Environmental Services 24:2056.27 25:2066.54 26:2100 6:damaging 6:eco friendly